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GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
GMC TRUCK DIVISION,
Defendant/Appellee
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the District Court
in a civil case.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court err in granting appellee's motion

for directed verdict?
In reviewing a directed verdict, the court "roust examine the
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party." Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners Association v. Grav-

stone Pines, Inc.. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982).

A directed ver-

dict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate in
a case whenever the party against whom the motion is asserted has
failed to offer substantial evidence in support of any element of
its claim upon which it bears the burden of proof. Taylor v. Keith
O'Brien. Inc.. 537 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1975).
2.

The trial court concluded that a 1973 recall of passen-

ger cars did not involve a substantially similar design to that of
the pickup truck involved in this accident and was therefore
irrelevant, and that the potential prejudicial effect of the
evidence outweighed any possible probative value.

(R. 290-92.)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of
the recall on that basis?
The admissibility of evidence is a question of law committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Rule 104(a), Utah

Rules of Evidence. The court's ruling may be reversed only if that
discretion was abused, State v. Bartley. 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah
App. 1989), and then only if admission of the evidence would have
had a substantial likelihood of bringing about a different result.
Hill v. Hartoa. 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 1983).
3.

Did the trial court err in requiring plaintiffs to order

and pay for transcripts of the cross-examination of their expert
witnesses, and transcripts of other evidence relevant to the issues
they raise on appeal, for inclusion in the record on appeal?

-2-

There is no Utah law establishing the standard of review for
this issue, but General Motors believes that the trial court is in
the best position to evaluate the content and importance of trial
evidence, and thus that the standard of review should be abuse of
discretion.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence:
Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion* If the appellant intends
to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of
all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a products liability action. Plaintiffs claim damages
for personal injuries and wrongful death arising out of a single
vehicle accident involving a 1986 GMC High Sierra pickup truck.
(R. 129-141.)
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Course of Proceedings Below
The case was tried to a jury on October 1 through 11, 1990.
(R. 383, 389-90, 415-18.)

After deliberating for several hours,

the jury reported back to the court that they were deadlocked in
a 4 to 4 tie on the first question (liability).

(R. 420, 674-75.)

The court gave an appropriate instruction and the jury returned to
deliberate further.
reported deadlock.

(R. 674-75.)
(Xd.)

After a short time, they again

Rather than discharging the jury, the

court, in effect, directed the jury to return a verdict for defendant because a verdict against the party having the burden of proof
on liability issues could be entered with fewer than six jurors
answering no.

(Id.)

The jury returned a verdict against plain-

tiffs on the liability issues.

(R. 421-25.)

The jury was polled

and four of the eight jurors concurred in the verdict.

(R. 678.)

In the process of ruling on post-trial motions, the court
reversed its position, declaring the verdict defective. After some
initial misunderstanding (R. 731-40), the court denied plaintiffs'
motion for new trial and granted defendant's motion for directed
verdict.

(R. 744-45.)

Plaintiffs appealed.

(R. 747-50.)

As

required by Rule 24(f), copies of the court's Minute Entry (R. 73940) and Order (R. 744-45) are attached at Tabs A and B of this
brief.
Statement of Facts
Plaintiffs' statement of facts recites their contentions with
-4-

respect to the facts surrounding the accident, but omits the evidence on the critical issue of causation. They also make two misstatements of fact which require correction.

First, they state

that the vehicle was approaching a "slight curve" when it left the
roadway.

The photographic evidence clearly shows that the curve

was not "slight" at all.
at Tab C.)

(E.g., exhibit 32, attached to this brief

Second, they point out that the road had been seal

coated a month or six weeks before the accident (Brief, 20), but
fail to mention that the rocks used in the seal coat were too small
to have jammed the steering in the manner which they alleged, and
that in any event the road surface itself was clean (Stephens
direct, 106; Johnson direct, 102).
The plaintiffs alleged that a rock was lofted up from the road
and lodged in the steering mechanism of the truck, locking the
steering.

Plaintiffs1 own expert described this scenario as "a

highly unlikely situation."

(E.g.. Manning cross, 12.)1

The

evidence regarding plaintiffs1 theory of causation, stated in the
light most favorable to plaintiffs, is as follows:
The vehicle has a flexible joint ("coupling") connecting the
steering box, which contains the gears, to the steering column.
The flexible coupling is necessary to ensure that the gears will

Because of the dispute over who should pay for the transcript, it was completed in two phases. Unfortunately, the two
phases are not consecutively numbered. Accordingly, we refer to
the witness1 name, portion of examination, and page number to assist the court in finding its way around duplicate page numbers.
-5-

not be laterally loaded, and thus bind, due to any slight misalignments of the column.

At the flexible coupling, where the shaft

from the steering box joins the column, the two segments are
separated by a fibrous bushing, which helps to prevent mechanical
noise and shock impulse from being transferred through the column
to the steering wheel.

Plaintiffs claimed that a rock lodged

between the coupling and the end retainer nut on the case of the
steering gear, preventing the driver from turning the steering
wheel to the left (had he turned to the right, the alleged rock
would have fallen out).
There was no dispute that, long before the truck left the
roadway, the driver had locked the brakes and, thus, the wheels;
all witnesses agreed there were continuous skid marks on and off
the road.

(Basye cross, 90-91.)2

With the brakes locked, the

truck could not steer regardless of whether the steering was
jammed—it

simply slid in a straight line in the path of its

momentum.

(Stephens cross, 57.)

The question was whether the

driver had tried to steer the vehicle before he applied the brakes
and began to skid, because having locked the brakes, he deprived
the tires of the ability to turn the vehicle, irrespective of
steering angle.

2

At page 19 of their brief, plaintiffs say that Mr. Manning
testified that they brakes did not lock when Wayne Nay applied
them. Mr. Manning did not so testify, and plaintiffs1 citation to
Manning's testimony does not support their assertion.
-6-

At trial, all of plaintiffs' experts agreed that, if a rock
had lodged between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut
and locked the steering, they would expect the turning and compression forces to leave a "witness mark" on the coupling or nut.
(Stephens cross, 49-53; Manning cross, 11; Basye cross, 87.)

Yet

the experts also agreed that the expected witness mark was not
present.

(Manning cross, 11-12, 15-16, 23; Stephens cross, 53-

55; Basye cross, 87.)

Mr. Stephens' testimony that he saw no

witness marks is particularly significant, because he was one of
the plaintiffs' experts and was the first person to examine, photograph, and disassemble the parts.

(Stephens cross, 49-53.)

The driver was a large man, 6' 3" tall, and, although plaintiffs' experts made no attempt to calculate the mechanical advantage in the steering system, the steering mechanism gave the driver
a mechanical advantage at the point the rock allegedly occupied of
about 15 to 1.

(Confer direct, 213-14; see Manning cross, 20-21.)

This means that one foot-pound of force exerted at the steering
wheel translates to 15 pounds of force at the point where the rock
allegedly lodged, more than enough to crush the rock or dislodge
it.

The average male can easily exert 200 foot-pounds of torque

on the steering wheel (Riede direct, 191-92), which translates to
3000 pounds of force on the rock.

When plaintiffs' experts

manually inserted a rock in their candidate location, and allowed
members of the jury to attempt to turn the steering wheel, the rock
always broke or popped loose.
-7-

(Manning direct, 25-26.)

Mr.

Stephens had conducted out-of-court tests with the same results.
(Stephens direct, 140.)

Thus, there was no evidence that a rock

could actually freeze the steering mechanism, even if there had
been a witness mark evidencing that a rock was actually present in
the mechanism, which there was not.
Similarly, there was no evidence that a rock of appropriate
shape and hardness had been present on this well-travelled haul
road, and no credible evidence of a mechanism or a path for the
rock to get from the road up into the gear, or a force available
to insert it into the space between the gear box and coupling.

In

fact, the evidence was that the drafts from the coal-hauling trucks
(the primary purpose of this road is to allow coal haulage from the
SUFCO mine; the road dead-ends there (Johnson direct, 99)) swept
the road surface clean.
Finally, the court should note that the trial court had before
it numerous items of physical evidence, including exemplars.

It

also participated with the jury in a view of a sister vehicle.
(Tr. vol. 2, pp. 195-98.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The court correctly directed the verdict for the defen-

dant because the plaintiffs did not present substantial evidence
that the accident was caused by a defect in the vehicle.

Plain-

tiffs' experts testified to causes of the accident which even they
described as remote possibilities, not reasonable probabilities.
-8-

A.

The plaintiffs1 burden was not just to provide any

evidence, however incredible, that a defect might have caused the
accident.

Their burden was M'to show that the circumstances sur-

rounding the accident were such as to justify a reasonable inference of probability, rather than a mere possibility, that the
[alleged design defects] were responsible.•M

Hersch v. United

States. 719 F.2d 873, 878 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Perkins v.
Trailco Mfg. and Sales Co.. 613 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Ky. 1981)
(editing by the court)).

The scenario which plaintiffs1 experts

proposed was totally improbable: contrary to the physical evidence
and, in some cases, to the laws of physics.
B.

Plaintiffs first had to prove that a rock of appro-

priate size would have been present on the road.

Accepting the

presence of the rock on faith, they next had to show how the rock
could get from the road into the steering coupling.

They proposed

that a tire picked a rock of relatively precise dimensions off the
road and, after multiple ricochets, the rock passed through a small
opening in a heavy rubber splash shield and inserted itself with
precisely the correct amount of force into the steering mechanism
of the truck.

One "expert" even went so far as to opine that the

rock flew over the engine from the passenger side of the car. The
experts admitted, however, that they did not really know how the
rock would get to the steering coupling, and that the mechanism
they proposed was "highly unlikely" and would occur "very infrequently."

They were willing to adopt this hypothesis because it
-9-

was not impossible and they could find no other defects in the
vehicle.

In so doing, they had to ignore the obvious lack of phy-

sical evidence to support the theory, and the overwhelming evidence
that the accident was caused by driver inattentiveness.
C.

The turning force the driver places on the steer-

ing wheel is multiplied by 15 times at the point where the rock
allegedly inserted, yet the experts opined that the rock survived
this force and did not break or fall out.

However, plaintiffs1

in-court demonstration of this hypothesis

(which required the

expert to carefully insert the rock into a specific area in the
steering coupling) confirmed that the rock always breaks or falls
out.

With the exception of one totally uncontrolled test in an

expert's driveway, all experts had the same experience.
D.
hypothesis.

The physical evidence also contravened the rock
The experts agreed that the compression force on the

rock would leave a witness mark on the coupling where the rock had
been, yet no witness mark was ever found. Moreover, the hypothesis
of no left-hand steering necessarily requires that the vehicle's
tracks as it left the road ought to project back up the roadway.
In fact, the tracks project sharply toward the shoulder of the road
on what would have been the driver's right (see photographs (exhibits 36 and 37) at Tab E) . This suggests that the driver inattentively drifted off the right hand side of the road, turned the
truck toward the left (this is necessary to align it with the skid
marks) and then locked the brakes.
-10-

With the brakes locked, the

truck would not turn regardless of the steering input from the
driver. Plaintiffs' experts admitted that they could not reconcile
the physical evidence with their rock hypothesis.
E.

This evidence was not "substantial evidence11 by

which a jury could have found a reasonable inference of probability that the accident was caused by a defect in the vehicle.
It was pure speculation.
II.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling

that evidence of a recall of a different model vehicle for a different alleged defect was inadmissible.

The court was familiar

with the differences in design of the two vehicles, and correctly
ruled that the evidence was irrelevant.
exercised

The court also correctly

its discretion to exclude the evidence because any

possible probative value the evidence may have had was outweighed
by its unfairly prejudicial effect.
A.

The threshold requirement for admission of recall

evidence is that the products and defects involved in the recall
are substantially the same as the products and defects at issue.
Even then, the evidence should be excluded if the danger of unfair
prejudice outweighs its probative value. Jordan v. General Motors
Corp. f 624 F. Supp. 72, 77 (E.D. La. 1985); Muniaa v. General
Motors Corp.. 102 Mich. App. 755, 302 N.W.2d 565, 568 (1980).
B.

The alleged problem in the recalled units was that

a rock could lodge between the flexible coupling and the frame of
the vehicle, resulting in a loss of steering. This could occur be-11-

cause the coupling was mounted inside the framef with a clearance
to the frame of only 1/4 inch.

Allegedly, a cross-member of the

recalled vehicles, which was below and directly in front of the
coupling, could bottom out on gravel roads and scoop rocks into the
area between the coupling and the frame.
C.

In the truck at issue in this case, however, there

is no cross member to scoop up rocks; plaintiffs1 experts theorized
that the only way for a rock to enter the coupling area is by multiple ricochets inside the wheelwell and through the heavy rubber
splash shield.

Even if a rock could breach those barriers, the

clearance between the coupling and the frame on the truck is 11/4 inches, so the frame-to-coupling interference cannot occur.
Plaintiffs1 experts testified to interference between the coupling
and the end retainer nut on the steering box, not between the
coupling and the frame.
C.

Plaintiffs argue that there was evidence of simi-

larity. The evidence to which they point is the testimony of witnesses who said that the component parts of the steering are the
same.

The problem, however, was not the parts, but rather the

proximity of those parts to the frame, combined with a specific
mechanism for scooping rocks into the area.

The trial court

correctly ruled that the recalled cars:
had an entirely different location and spatial relationship between the flexible coupling and the frame rail
than the one involved in this case. Additionally the
manner and method in which gravel or rocks could be
introduced into the flexible coupling area involve the
-12-

scooping of gravel by a frame cross-member. The vehicle in question has no frame cross-member. (R. 291.)
III. Rule 11(e)(2) requires the appellant to obtain transcripts of "all evidence relevant to" a conclusion which the
appellant intends to challenge. The trial court correctly applied
this rule to require the appellants to order transcripts of the
cross-examination of their own experts, and the testimony of other
witnesses which bears upon the experts' conclusions.
A.

In deciding whether the plaintiffs have made out a

prima facie case, "the evidence must be viewed as a whole, including the status of the evidence after cross-examination."

Obera v.

Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229, 233 (1947).
B.

In reviewing a directed verdict or a judgment not-

withstanding the verdict under the substantial evidence standard,
the appellate court looks at the evidence as a whole, not just the
evidence elicited by plaintiffs' counsel on direct examination.
Plaintiffs ask the court to disregard undisputed evidence which is
directly relevant to their assertions, simply because the evidence
did not come out in direct examination of their witnesses.

The

court should not impair its understanding of the evidence on that
basis.

-13-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURTfS ENTRY OF A DIRECTED VERDICT WAS
CORRECT.
A.

Standard of Review.

In reviewing a directed verdict, the court "must examine the
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party." Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners Association v. Graystone Pines. Inc.. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982).

A directed

verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate
in a case whenever the party against whom the motion is asserted
has failed to offer substantial evidence in support of any element
of its claim upon which it bears the burden of proof.
Keith O'Brien, Inc., 537 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1975).

Taylor v.

In deciding

whether the trial court acted correctly, the court must consider
the status of the evidence after cross-examination:
Does the evidence constitute a prima facie case of
damage by fraudulent representations or deceit? In testing the sufficiency of the evidence on motion for nonsuit, the evidence must be viewed as a whole, including
the status of the evidence after cross-examination.
Obera v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229, 233 (1947).
Plaintiffs' burden was to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the accident was caused by a defect in the vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6. The "defect" plaintiffs chose to assert
was that a rock could be lofted up from the road, enter the wheel
well, ricochet through a splash shield, drop into the space between
-14-

the coupling and the gear case, not break or fall out, and deprive
the driver of steering control over the vehicle.

In order to

prevail, plaintiffs had to provide "substantial, competent evidence
upon which a jury acting fairly and reasonably" could find that
plaintiffs' postulate was more probable than not.

See Dairyland

Insurance Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1982).

They did

not do so.
B.

Plaintiffs Failed to Prove That a Defect in the
Vehicle Caused the Accident.

Plaintiffs called three expert witnesses in support of their
theory:
1.

David Stephens, Lindley Manning, and Charles Basye.
David Stephens.

Mr. Stephens described himself as "a consultant in the field
of accident and safety."

(Stephens direct, 102.)

He was an

insurance claims manager for 25 years, obtained a masters degree
in "safety" and became a "consultant."

(Id.)

He described his

"mechanical experience" as follows:
I was a service station attendant when I was 15
years old. I've been turning nuts and bolts in some
degree ever since.
In the mid-'70's, I worked as a
volunteer with a friend of mine who ran a board race car
and I was his crew chief. We campaigned that car in
California, Arizona, Utah and Colorado.
I've done
extensive work on my own personal cars, and I restore
cars. (Id., 103.)
Mr. Stephens was the first expert witness to inspect the vehicle, about five days after the accident.

(Id., 105.) He testified

that he washed, examined, and photographed the steering coupling
-15-

at that time and saw no witness mark which would support the plaintiffs1 theory.

(Cross, 53.)

He also testified that he saw no

witness marks on the end retainer nut attached to the gear.
54, 55.)

(Id.,

The following exchange is important because the plain-

tiffs did not retain the coupling for inspection by others:
Q
You mentioned that you were not looking for
witness marks on the flexible coupling or the end
retainer nut. Had there been something unusual about
that, you would have considered it, would you not?
A
If it had been unusual, and I had also seen it,
I probably—
Q

You're a trained investigator?

A

Yes.

Q

You did not know the cause of the accident?

A

Correct.

Q

You were looking for something in the steering?

A

Yes.

Q
hands?

And you had those parts right in your very

A

Yes.

I did.

Q

You cleaned them up?

A

Yes.

Q

And you disassembled them?

A

Right.

Q

And you photographed them?

A

Yes.

Q
And you adjusted your camera for the proper
exposure?
-16-

A
Q
focus?
A

Yes.
And did you adjust your camera for the proper
Yes.

Q
And those photographs were in good focus,
weren't they?
A

Yes.

I'm proud of 'em.

Q

I would think so.
And the photograph showed no witness marks?

A
The photographs don't show anything that could
show witness marks. They aren't of the components that
would show. They're not the right angle to show witness
marks if they had been taken. Ambiguous? I'm sorry, but
I think I made my meaning.

Q
Had you noticed anything unusual while you were
setting up for that very careful photography, you would
have photographed that, would you not?
A

I would have, yes.

Q

And you saw nothing unusual?

A

I saw nothing.

(Recross, 64-66.)

Plaintiffs rely heavily on Stephens' testimony that his examination of the width of the tire tracks led him to conclude that the
front wheels were not turned when the truck left the road.

Even

taken at face value, the testimony does not establish, or even tend
to prove, a defect in the vehicle. The proof plaintiffs lacked was
substantial evidence that their hypothesized mechanism for jamming
the steering was plausible.
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Stephens testimony regarding the tire tracks was based on two
very subjective pieces of evidence:

1) Mr. Stephens1 observation

of the accident scene five days after the accident, where he observed that, on that day, weeds near the tire tracks did not appear
to be bent over (Stephens direct, 135, 143-45);3 and 2) pictures
of

the

accident

scene,

which

were

subject

to

various

interpretations (exhibits 13, 29, 81, 90, 96-102; Riede direct,
262-63, 270-74).

(A copy of exhibit 29 is included at Tab D of the

appendix so the court can see for itself the evidence upon which
Mr. Stephens based his opinion.)

In evaluating whether this

testimony is meaningful, it is important to keep in mind that the
vehicle traveled

straight over the hill, so the back wheels

traveled through the path of the front wheels.
On cross-examination Stephens conceded that the tire tracks
found at the accident scene showed that the right front tire had
gone off the pavement and onto the shoulder, and had then turned
to the left back onto the pavement a considerable distance back
from the curve.

(Stephens cross, 58-60.)

In fact, photographs

show that the truck's angle of momentum is not in a straight line
with the roadway, but rather is at a considerable angle originating
from the right shoulder.

(Stephens1 dilemma is clearly apparent

3

Defendant's witness, Newell Knight, measured the tire tracks
on the same day as Mr. Stephens. Mr. Knight testified that the
tracks appeared to be seven to eight inches wide near the edge of
the hill, but that they were wider back where the vehicle left the
pavement. (Knight cross, 168; exhibit 36.) That is also apparent
from exhibits 29 and 81.
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in exhibits 36 and 37, copies attached at Tab E; the white tapes
in the photos have been placed along the skid marks.)

This evi-

dence suggested that the driver had inattentively drifted off the
right hand side of the road, begun (without interference from any
rocks) a left turn back onto the pavement, found himself going too
fast for the approaching curve, and locked the brakes.
cross, 19; Riede direct, 258-60)

(Manning

Stephens admitted:

Q
When you traced out the path of the vehicle
going backwards up towards the crest of the hill; you
found it, the path, to run toward the right shoulder of
the road, did you not?
A

Yes.

I did.

Q

You could not explain that, could you?

A
I didn't explain it, no. I observed it and
considered it, and wasn't able to find an answer.
(Cross, 58.)
In other words, Stephens could not even reconcile his opinion with
the physical evidence at the accident scene.
In their case in chief, plaintiffs did not attempt to qualify
Mr. Stephens as an expert on anything other than accident reconstruction, yet in their brief plaintiffs look to him as an advocate
of the stone interference theory.

When asked on direct examina-

tion, "What is your opinion in regard to the stone interference
theory?", Mr. Stephens responded simply, "Seems reasonable to me."
(Stephens direct, 141.)4
4

On rebuttal, Stephens did get into the area of mechanical
engineering. Stephens was plaintiffs' only rebuttal witness, for
reasons which were apparent: No competent mechanical engineer
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When asked if he had been able to duplicate the alleged
jamming of the steering system, he replied that he had not:
I've put, oh, more than a dozen, certainly, rocks
in there and turned it, and tried to jam them between the
ramp portions like in here and between the ramp and the
notches in the ring gear. And in each case, I have
broken the rock, or the rock has flipped out. I've never
been able to get it so I couldn't possibly turn it. But
I have gone through it many times. (Id., 140.)
Finally,

at the conclusion

of redirect

examination, Mr.

Stephens admitted that his extensive examination of the vehicle had
not revealed any mechanical defect:
In spite of the fact that I've not been able to
identify any specific, or personally identified any
specific mechanical failure or function in the vehicle
which caused the accident; the evidence that I have
reviewed convinces me that it was not a driver error
problem. (Redirect, 162-63.)
2.

Lindley Manning.

Mr. Manning is a professional witness. He admitted to having
made about 150 trial appearances and given 500 depositions in the
past three years.

(Manning cross, 3, 6.)

His claimed specialty

is mechanical engineering. He admitted on cross that he would give
an opinion in most any case involving a mechanical function, including ladders, snowmobiles, lawnmowers, washing machines, garden
tools, punch presses, conveyor belts, elevators, and now, steering

could espouse the theory plaintiffs were then espousing, which was
that the alleged rock flew from the passenger side tire, over the
engine, and into the flexible coupling. See discussion beginning
at page 26 of this brief.
-20-

couplings.

(Id., 4.) He also claims to be an auto accident recon-

struct ionist.

(Id., 5.)

Mr. Manning testified that he thought stone interference was
the most likely cause of the accident, but also admitted that the
probability of it happening was "highly unlikely."

(Id., 12.) He

testified that his opinion was based on the fact that others had
postulated this defect and he could find no other defects (Id.,
12) ; however, he also testified that he would expect a witness mark
on the parts (id., 11), that the parts had been disturbed when he
saw them (id., 13), that the photographs by Mr. Stephens were
inconclusive

(redirect, 46) , and that he had not bothered to

closely examine the photographic negatives (recross, 40).
He also testified that he had no information on the mechanical
advantage the steering system gave the driver and had made no
effort to calculate it or its effect on the alleged rock or, consequently, on the alleged accident scenario.

(Cross, 20-23.) He did

not know what kind of tires were on the accident vehicle, but was
nevertheless willing to say that they would pick up a rock of the
necessary dimensions.

(Recross, 36; redirect, 41-44.)

The steering coupling in question is located forward and above
the center of the wheel (Manning cross, 24) and 8 to 10 inches inboard from the inside edge of tire.

(Stephens cross, 43.)

It is

separated from the wheel well by an inner fender and heavy rubber
protective

skirt

("splash shield").

(Basye direct,

207-08.)

Manning admitted that it is not possible for the tire to pick up
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a rock and deposit it directly on the steering coupling.
recross, 37.)

(Manning

If it is even possible at all, it could only occur

after multiple ricochets.

(Id., 37-38.)

Although Manning testified that it was possible for a rock to
ricochet from the wheel well to the steering coupling, he was not
aware that the Nay vehicle had the protective splash shield blocking the hypothesized path of the rock (Manning's opinion was based
on examination of an older truck that did not contain the shield).
(Cross, 24-28.)

Manning simply speculated that these multiple

ricochets must have occurred because he could find no evidence of
any other defect (id., 12). The truth is, he presented no evidence
of any defect at all.
3.

Charles Basye.

Mr. Basye is an engineering professor from the University of
Missouri who consults as an expert witness on the side.

(Basye

cross, 67-68.) He testified that the design was defective because
of the remote possibility that a rock could bounce off the road
into the steering coupling.
would happen.
happen."

"I can't tell you how frequently it

It would be extremely infrequently.

But it could

(Direct, 190.)

Basye was the only witness to testify that he could cause the
steering to jam by manually placing a rock between the end retainer
nut and the flexible coupling.

(Direct, 189.)

The experiment,

however, was conducted in Mr. Basye's driveway, with a stationary
vehicle.

(Direct, 185, 188-190.)
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He testified on cross-examina-

tion that he had no idea what mechanical advantage the system
afforded the driver or how much turning force was applied in the
test.

(Cross 84-85.)

He did not instruct the person in the truck

how hard to turn the steering wheel and has no idea what effort was
made.

(Id., 85.)

He did not instrument the truck, although it

would have been easy to do.

(Id., 82-83.)

He did not even know

the hardness of the rock used or whether rocks in his driveway in
Missouri are comparable in hardness to rocks that might have been
in the area of the accident.
"experiment"

was

totally

(Id. 89.)

uncontrolled

and

In other words, the
the

hypothesis

it

supposedly "proved" was purely speculative.
Basye testified that, in his opinion, the accident was caused
by a foreign object becoming lodged in the area between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut.

(Direct, 218.)

Even on

direct examination, the speculative nature of the opinion was
apparent:
Q
Okay. Now let me ask you, well, is there one
particular [sic] for a rock to leave the tire and get up
into this area—is there one particular direction that
you would believe it would have to travel to get to that
location?
A
it got
wheel,
inside
cannot

I cannot be that precise, Mr. Hansen, as to how
there. If it was indeed a rock thrown by the
I can't say precisely how many times it rebounded
the wheel well or something else in there. I
say, no, sir. (Direct, 217-18.)

This speculation became even more apparent when the basis for the
opinion was probed on cross-examination:
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Q
You've done no testing at all on how a rock
would get from the road to the gear?
A
Q
that?
A

You mean have I —
Run it down a graveled road or anything like
No.

I really haven1t.

Q
You've done no qualitative analysis of vectors
and so forth as you used and so forth to see how many
ricochets it would take and how you would get it from
this point to this point?
A

No.

(Cross, 86-87.)

Q
How many ricochets would it take to get a rock
from the road surface to the coupling?
A

I can't answer that, Mr. Clegg.

Q
How many directions does it have to make if it
flipped up in the same plane as the tire; how many
rotations does it make to thread through that hole in the
splash shield and into that coupling?
A

I don't know.

Q
Can it go directly from the hole in the
coupling into the—or directly from the hole in the
splash shield into the coupling?
A
It would happen on extremely infrequently, as
I said earlier today, as to how many ricochets precisely,
that is something I can't answer. I don't know.
Q
I'm asking you though, can it come in a direct
line through the splash shield into the coupling—
A

Yes.

Q

—without ricocheting inside of the frame area?

A

What are you asking me?

Q
I'm asking
straight line?

if it can come directly
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in a

A

Yes.

Q
From the hole you're talking about into the
coupling?
A

Yes.

Q

And where is it going to hit in the—

A
I don't know. I said I think and I think this
is the most probable cause of this accident, a foreign
object, where in the geometry of the clock, it would have
lodged, I don't know. (Cross, 89-90.)
Finally, Mr. Basye testified that he would expect to find some
witness mark on the parts if his scenario were correct.
87.)

(Cross,

He did not know what the mark might look like, had done no

testing to try to find out (id.)/ and did not even know the hardness of the materials involved (id. 89).
4.

Summary.

The real issue in this case is how far the court must allow
an expert witness to stretch the bounds of reality, credibility,
and his own experience before the court can simply reject the
plaintiffs' hypothesis as unsupported by substantial evidence. In
this case, Mr. Stephens admitted he could find no defect but was
nevertheless willing to opine that driver error was not the cause
of the accident.

That is not "substantial" evidence. Mr. Manning

opined that a rock impinged the steering components because he
could find no evidence of any other defect, not because he saw evidence to support that theory.

Mr. Basye's opinion was completely
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speculative, and even he admitted that the scenario he postulated
was highly unlikely.
Those opinions were nothing but speculation.
the problem of "purchased" testimony.
arrayed against them was overwhelming.

They epitomize

The physical evidence
No expert could duplicate

the condition, except through manually inserting a carefully chosen
rock between two steering components; even thenf it could not be
made to stay there.

None of the physical evidence the experts

expected to find, and particularly the witness mark which such an
event would obviously leave on the parts, was present.

Those

"experts" who knew the physical orientation of the parts (Manning
did not) speculated to the most improbable of scenarios: Basye was
willing to suppose a rock coming from the tread of the left front
tire, with multiple ricochets culminating in the rock passing
through a hole smaller than a person's fist and landing on the
coupling in precisely the right place and with precisely the right
force.
Perhaps Mr. Stephens1
problem best.

rebuttal testimony

illustrates the

He testified that a rock "tiddley-winked" from the

inside edge of the passenger side front tire and somehow found its
way 1) out of the wheel well; 2) under or through the right splash
shield; 3) over or under the right frame rail; 4) into the engine
compartment; 5)

over the engine; 6) past the left frame rail; 7)

into the critical space between the coupling and end retainer nut;
8) lodged tightly there and did not break or fall out; 9) and
-26-

interfered with steering.

(Stephens rebuttal, cross, 263-266.)

Such a stone's forward motion through all this would allow it to
keep up with the vehicle's speed of 50 mph, despite no forward
moving forces. All this had to happen within a quarter mile of the
accident site (exhibit 29; Riede direct, 248), where the truck has
just successfully and uneventfully negotiated a left curve, proving
no interference at that point.
direct, 106.)

(Manning cross, 12-13; Stephens

All this from an "expert" with no formal training

in engineering or physics; in fact, his highest course in mathematics was high school algebra.

(Stephens rebuttal, cross, 263.)

Is the trial judge obliged to disregard all principles of physics
and common sense

when a person is willing to proclaim himself

worthy of opinion?
Judge Moffat was correct in deciding that this evidence was
not substantial and that a jury acting reasonably could not have
believed it. Plaintiffs' burden was more than just to show a hypothetical possibility:

Their burden was "'to show that the circum-

stances surrounding the accident were such as to justify a reasonable inference of probability, rather than a mere possibility, that
the [alleged design defects] were responsible.'" Hersch v. United
States. 719 F.2d 873, 878 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Perkins v.
Trailco Mfg. and Sales Co.. 613 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Ky. 1981)
(editing by the court)).

As the Fourth Circuit has held:

Permissible inferences must still be within the range of
reasonable probability, however, and it is the duty of
the court to withdraw the case from the jury when the
-27-

necessary inference is so tenuous that it rests merely
upon speculation and conjecture.
Ford Motor Co. v. McDavid, 259 F.2d 261, 266 (4th Cir.), cert,
denied, 358 U.S. 908 (1958).
Plaintiffs were required to provide substantial evidence from
which the jury could conclude that each step in their hypothesis
was more probable than not. Their "experts" made naked assertions,
unsupported by any testing or any physical evidence, that the accident was caused by an alleged "defect" because they could find no
other defects.

If that is "substantial" evidence, then there is

no case which should not go to the jury because there is no case
in which a suitable "expert" cannot be hired.
C.

The Inability of the Jury to Agree Is Irrelevant to
the Correctness of the Court's Entry of a Directed
Verdict.

Plaintiffs argue that the fact that four jurors apparently
believed plaintiffs1 hypothesis proves that the hypothesis was
supported by substantial evidence.
step further, asserting

They carry this argument one

(incorrectly) that the court initially

denied the directed verdict motion at the conclusion of plaintiffs1
case in chief (he took it under advisement (R. 416)) and that the
asserted denial precludes the court from later holding that substantial evidence was not presented.
Plaintiffs1 position ignores fundamental provisions of the
rules of civil procedure.

If the fact that some members of the

jury agreed with the plaintiffs were sufficient basis for resisting
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a directed verdict, there could never be a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. Similarly, when a directed verdict motion is initially denied, Mthe court is deemed to have submitted the action to the
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised
by the motion."

Rule 50(b), U.R.C.P.

The final sentence of Rule

50(b) is directly on point:
If no verdict was returned the court may direct the entry
of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed
or may order a new trial.
See Graham v. Intermountain Electric. Inc., 487 P.2d 607, 608
(Colo. App. 1971) (directed verdict proper under Rule 50(b) when
jury is unable to reach agreement); Hall v. Container Corporation
of America. 189 So.2d 211, 212 (Fl. App* 1966) (upholding directed
verdict first denied and then granted after jury announced it could
not arrive at a verdict).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OF
THE RECALL UNDER RULE 403 BECAUSE THE DESIGN
INVOLVED WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE
ACCIDENT VEHICLE.
A.

Standard of Review.

The admissibility of evidence is a question of law committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Rule 104(a), Utah

Rules of Evidence. The court's ruling may be reversed only if that
discretion was abused, State v. Bartleyf 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah
App. 1989), and then only if admission of the evidence would have
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had a substantial likelihood of bringing about a different result.
Hill v. Hartocr. 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 1983).
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Finding that the Design Involved in the Recall Was
Not Substantially Similar to the Design of the
Accident Vehicle.

The trial court concluded that a 1973 recall of passenger cars
did not involve a substantially similar design to that of the pickup truck involved in this accident. The court therefore ruled that
the evidence was irrelevant; and, applying Rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence, that even if relevant its potential prejudicial effect
outweighed its probative value.

(R. 290-92.)

correct and either is dispositive.

Both rulings were

(Plaintiffs did not include a

copy of the courtfs Minute Entry in their brief, so defendant has
included one in this brief at Tab F.)
The threshold requirement for admission of recall evidence is
that the products and defects involved in the recall are substantially the same as the products and defects at issue.

Jordan v.

General Motors Corp., 624 F. Supp. 72, 77 (E.D. La. 1985); Muniqa
v. General Motors Corp.. 102 Mich. App. 755, 302 N.W.2d 565, 568
(1980).

Even then, the evidence may be excluded if the danger of

unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value.
5

Id.5

Courts have also held that a manufacturer should not be
penalized for obeying the law and instituting a recall, for the
same reason that subsequent remedial measures are inadmissible
under Rule 407, U.R.E. Vockie v. General Motors Corp., 66 F.R.D.
57, 61 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 523 F.2d 1052 (3rd Cir.
1975); Landry v. Adam. 282 So.2d 590, 596 (La. App. 1973). Judge
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The recall involved 1971 and 1972 ,fBlf cars (Caprice, Impala,
etc.).

The claim was that the clearance between the steering cou-

pling and the frame of the vehicle was too close.

This allegedly

could allow rocks to lodge between the coupling and the frame, and
jam the steering.

(See plaintiffs' brief, p. 25.) The trial court

correctly ruled that the recalled cars
had an entirely different location and spatial relationship between the flexible coupling and the frame rail
than the one involved in this case. Additionally the
manner and method in which gravel or rocks could be
introduced into the flexible coupling area involve the
scooping of gravel by a frame cross-member. The vehicle
in question has no frame cross-member. (R. 291.)
The court's ruling was based on evidence that the design of
the B cars differs in several significant respects from that of the
pickup truck in question in this case:
1.

The steering coupling in the truck is about 1-1/4" away

from the frame rail (R. 186; Confer depo., vol. II, p. 15; Confer
redirect, 242-243), whereas in the B cars the coupling is mounted
inside the frame rail, and the clearance is 1/4" to 3/8" (R. 185).
The alleged problem which the recall was designed to fix, rocks

Moffat adopted this view as an alternative to the views advocated
in the text:
The defendant herein should not be subjected to the
prejudice likely to be attached to the information
regarding the 1973 recall simply because it was being
somewhat cautious in its approach to the alleged problem
when in fact the 1973 cars involved had an entirely
different location and spatial relationship between the
flexible coupling and the frame rail . . . .
(R. 291.)
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lodging in the 1/4 inch space between the frame and the coupling,
cannot occur because that space in the truck is so much greater.
(R. 185.)
2.

The recall did not simply involve the proximity of the

coupling and the frame.

It also involved the alleged ability of

a frame cross-member to bottom out on the road and scoop rocks
directly into the coupling/frame area. That cross-member was close
to the road and just ahead of the gear and coupling in the B car.
(R. 185.) The truck does not have the ability to scoop rocks from
the road because it does not have the necessary cross-member, and
the steering coupling on the truck is several inches higher off the
road than the one in the B car (Confer depo., vol. II, pp. 40, 75).
General Motors' notification to the NHTSA (which is Exhibit C to
plaintiffs' brief but does not appear to be part of the record in
the court below) clearly describes the mechanism by which the frame
allegedly scooped rocks into the coupling area and its importance
to the decision to recall:
When these cars are driven on unpaved road surfaces,
particularly roads which are heavily graveled and which
are extremely wavy, rutted or filled with chuck holes,
at speeds which cause the car to pitch excessively, the
front crossmember may scoop up loose stones or gravel
from the roadway. These stones may be thrown up into the
engine compartment. The possibility exists that one of
these stones may lodge between the steering coupling and
the frame and cause increased steering effort or interference with steering control of the car when the steering wheel is turned to the left.
3.
ent.

Plaintiffs' claim in the case at bar is entirely differ-

Plaintiffs1 claim here is not that a rock became lodged be-32-

tween the frame and the coupling, but rather that the rock became
lodged between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut on
the upper rear of the steering gear box, not between the coupling
and the frame.6

(R. 265; Basye direct, 218-19.)

Plaintiffs rely on the affidavit of Charles Basye that the
"Saginaw steering system used in the 1986 GMC High Sierra pickup
truck . . . was mechanically and functionally essentially equivalent to the steering system used in the [B car]."

(R. 265.)

Mr.

Basye's testimony is irrelevant: The steering column and gearcase
may be the same and perform the same steering function, but they
are installed in entirely different positions in the vehicles, and
the vehicles' ability to place rocks into the area of the coupling
is different.

It was these last reasons that resulted in the

recall.
Plaintiffs also cite Mr. Confer's deposition testimony that
"[i]f you want to relate now to the steering gear, the coupling,
there's no difference between the B car and the truck, they're the
same."

(Plaintiffs' brief, p. 34.) Plaintiffs' use of this testi-

mony is misleading. Mr. Confer carefully qualified his testimony,
6

In their brief, plaintiffs somewhat disingenuously assert
that their claim is that "a stone was scooped into the engine compartment." (Brief, p. 26.) In fact, their claim is that a tire
flipped a stone off the road and, through a series of totally improbable ricochets and despite the presence of intermediate obstructions, the stone somehow reached and lodged between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut. (Manning recross, 37.)
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stating that "the steering gear, the coupling" are the same.

In

other words, the parts are the same. The critical issue, however,
which Mr. Confer made abundantly clear in his deposition (and which
was clear to Judge Moffat as well (R. 291)), is that the installation and orientation of the parts in the truck and the B car are
totally different.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion

in this regard, and its ruling should be affirmed.
C.

Lowe v. General Motors Involved an Entirely Different Claim from the Case at Bar.

On appeal, for the first time, plaintiffs place heavy reliance
on the Fifth Circuit case of Lowe v. General Motors Corp. , 624 F.2d
1373 (5th Cir. 1980) . Plaintiffs erroneously assert that the claim
in Lowe was the same as the claim in the case at bar.

Plaintiffs

have misunderstood the facts and the issue in Lowe.
It requires a careful reading of the case to discern the difference between Lowe and the case at bar. In Lowe, the plaintiffs1
decedent was driving a recalled B car. The plaintiffs' expert testified that a rock lodged in the small space between the coupling
and the frame, which caused the steering to jam. He further testified that, as a result of resulting fatigue and stress caused by
the interfering stone, a tooth of the Pitman shaft fractured, which
is what ultimately caused the vehicle to veer off the road.
F.2d at 1376.

624

The stone did not prevent the column from turning

except when it was in contact with the frame.
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The issue in Lowe was not evidentiary.

The issue was whether

the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 created a private cause of
action.

The plaintiffs had argued that GMfs alleged violation of

the Act (by having insufficient repair parts available to dealers
and not adequately explaining the danger to owners) was negligence
per se. The trial court rejected that claim, holding that "allowing evidence of any violation by GM of the MVSA to establish negligence per se was the equivalent of allowing a direct cause of
action under the MVSA, contravening the holding of Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975)." 624 F.2d at 1376. The Circuit's ruling was that:
[T]here was sufficient evidence submitted for the trial
court to allow the jury to determine whether GM's recall
campaign gave inadequate warning of the danger to 1971
Chevrolet Impala owners and whether this was a proximate
cause of the deaths . . . .
Id. at 1381.

No such claim was, or could have been, asserted in

the case at bar.
In a lengthy footnote (Brief, p. 28 n.3), plaintiffs go outside the record to charge that the Lowe case was similar to this
case and that GM concealed the existence of that case in discovery
responses.

It is apparent enough from the foregoing discussion

that the case involved an entirely different claim than the case
at bar, and GM's discovery responses clearly disclosed to plaintiffs that they were limited to claims similar to the plaintiffs'
claim here—that a rock lodged between the flexible coupling and
the steering gear assembly (GM did not simply draw a line between

-35-

cars and trucks).

Plaintiffs did not challenge that limitation in

the trial court.
However, GM feels a need to respond more completely to the
charge. Accordingly, GM has also gone outside the record to obtain
the affidavit of Eugene D. Martenson, one of the lawyers who represented GM in the Lowe case. The affidavit is attached at Tab G of
this brief. Mr. Martenson explains that the issue in the case was
not whether the recall was relevant, but whether the recall statute
gave rise to a private cause of action (56). He also explains in
more detail the fact that Lowe involved a claim of interference
between the coupling and frame, not the coupling and steering gear
assembly:
The investigating officer and wrecker driver testified
that they found a rock wedged and held fast in the
coupling. The plaintiff experts opined that this rock
rotated with the coupling and caused stone interference
with the frame as described in the "B-Car" recall.
It was plaintiffs1 theory that the rock precluded
proper rotation of the coupling and, hence, the steering
column, resulting in fatigue and eventual breakage of an
internal gear within the steering gear box.

When the reported decision (624 F.2d 1373) refers
to a stone "inside the steering coupling" (p. 1376), it
refers to a stone allegedly trapped within the rotating
steering coupling with part of this stone allegedly
protruding and contacting the frame of the plaintiffs1
vehicle.
(Affidavit, 55 4, 5, 8.)

The claim is clearly different from the

claim asserted by the plaintiffs in the case at bar.
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D.

Summary.

Admissibility of evidence is committed to the trial court's
discretion.

The trial court correctly ruled that there was insuf-

ficient similarity between the recall and the claim in this case
to make the recall evidence relevant at all.

The trial court's

alternative ruling, that the unfair prejudice the evidence might
work against GM outweighed any slight probative value the evidence
may have had, was also correct.

The rulings should be affirmed.

POINT III
THE COURT CORRECTLY ORDERED PLAINTIFFS TO PAY
FOR THE TRANSCRIPT OF ALL EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO
THE ISSUES THEY RAISE ON APPEAL.
A.

Standard of Review.

There is no Utah law establishing the standard of review for
this issue, but General Motors believes that the trial court is in
the best position to evaluate the content and importance of trial
evidence, and thus that the standard of review should be abuse of
discretion.
B.

The Court's Ruling Was Correct.

Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides:
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to
the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or
conclusion.
The rule does not say that plaintiffs must provide all evidence "supporting" their theory; rather, it requires them to
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provide all evidence "relevant" to their theory. Accordingly, the
Utah Court of Appeals has held:
In essence, Rule 11 directs counsel to provide this court
with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on
appeal.
Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App. 1989).
Plaintiffs1 docketing statement listed the following as an
issue on appeal:
Did the trial court err in granting defendant's Motion
for Directed Verdict on the issue of negligence in light
of plaintiffs1 weighty expert witness testimony?
In ordering the transcripts of that "weighty" expert testimony, plaintiffs ordered only the direct and redirect examination
of those experts transcribed, and failed to order the transcripts
of cross-examination or of other "weighty" evidence which supported
General Motors.

The rule, however, requires a transcript of "all

evidence relevant to" the court's conclusion on the issue, and
clearly contemplates that cross examination and other evidence will
be transcribed.
Defendant also designated for transcription the testimony of
Chester Johnson, Newell Knight, Jerry Confer, and Pete Riede.
These individuals all gave expert testimony relevant to the cause
of the accident, which is clearly relevant to the issue plaintiffs
raise. Under Rule 11(e)(2), plaintiffs were required to order and
pay for transcripts of their testimony as well.
Plaintiffs misstate the standard the appellate court will
apply in reviewing the directed verdict in this case.
-38-

They say

the standard is whether, looking only at evidence elicited by the
plaintiffs1 attorney, and disregarding everything else, any evidence at all exists that might have supported a verdict for plaintiffs. That proposed standard is incorrect. The correct standard
is whether the evidence as a whole is substantial enough to permit
a jury, acting reasonably, to find for the plaintiffs. Management
Committee of Gravstone Pines Homeowners Association v. Graystone
Pines. Inc.. 652 P.2d 896, 898

(Utah 1982); Tavlor v. Keith

O'Brien. Inc.. 537 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1975).

This standard differs

from the standard as stated by plaintiffs in that it allows the
court to consider all of the evidence, not just the evidence elicited by plaintiffs' lawyer.

That is why a motion for directed

verdict must be renewed at the close of all the evidence to preserve the ability to move for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
This is illustrated by an example from the trial of this case.
Mr. Manning testified, in direct examination by plaintiffs' counsel, to a scenario in which a rock could be lofted up from the
road, pass from the wheel well to the engine compartment, and lodge
in the steering. He based this opinion on studies of a 1979 model
year pickup truck in a St. Louis case.

However, in the cross-

examination of Mr. Basye, another of plaintiffs' experts,

and in

the direct examination of Mr. Riede, an employee of General Motors
(Riede direct, 183), it was brought out that the model of truck
which plaintiffs' decedent was driving had a heavy rubber splash
-39-

shield between the wheel well and the engine compartment, which
prevents the scenario which Mr. Manning speculated could occur.
Plaintiffs want this court to consider Mr. Manningfs testimony without the benefit

of the

undisputed facts

brought

out

in

the cross-examination of Mr. Basye and in the examination of Mr.
Riede, which make Mr. Manning's hypothesis totally impossible.
They cannot do that. That is the reason the Taylor case speaks in
terms of the evidence, not just plaintiffs1 direct evidence.

It

is also the reason the Supreme Court held in Obercr v. Sanders, 111
Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229 (1947), that Mthe evidence must be viewed
as a whole, including the status of the evidence after crossexamination. "
Plaintiffs chose to raise these issues on appeal.

The rules

require them, not the defendant, to provide the appellate court
with all evidence bearing upon the factual conclusions which they
have placed in issue.
CONCLUSION
Defendant requests that this court affirm the decision of the
trial court.
DATED this #C1 day of August, 1991.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Rodney R.* Parker
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee
were served by first class mail on August 27, 1991, as follows:
Stephen G. Morgan
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Rodney Rv. Parker
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LEEANN NAY, et al.
Plaintiff,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

Case No. 880906114 PI

vs.

:

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
et al,

:

Defendants.

The Court having
from

Counsel

considered

the

various

correspondence

regarding the Order heretofore signed on April 15,

1991 entitled "Order Granting New Trial and Directed Verdict"
prepared

by

Counsel

as

for the plaintiffs and being fully advised

in the premises now makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
It was the Courts intention at the time of the hearing
the

Motion

for

a

on

New Trial and the defendants', then pending,

Motion for Directed Verdict to do the following in this order.
1.

Set

aside the verdict as being improper by reason of

an insufficient number of

jurors

being

able

to

arrive

at a

verdict.
2.
Verdict.

Grant and enter the defendants7 Motion for a

Directed

NAY V GENERAL MOTORS CORP.

3.

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

Deny the plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial.

Counsel

for

the

defendants

will prepare an appropriate

Order and Directed Verdict^
DATED this

j

day of May, 1991.

.MOFFAT
*T JUDGE
$
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Third Judicial Di&irict

MAY 2 3 1931
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H. JAMES CLEGG ( A 0 6 8 1 )

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorney for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LEEANN NAY, individually and
as personal representative for
MATTHEW AND MERISSA NAY, the
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and
as personal representatives for
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and JALYNN
NAY, the heirs of WAYNE NAY,

AMENDED ORDER ON POST-TRIAL
MOTIONS AND DIRECTED VERDICT

Civil No. C 88-6114

Plaintiffs,
Judge Richard H. Moffat

vs
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
GMC TRUCK DIVISION AND RON
GREENE CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC,
INC. ,
Defendants.

It having been called to the Court's attention that counsel
for the parties disagree on the meaning of the Order entered
April 15, 1991 and a review of that Order disclosing some
ambiguity, the Court hereby makes and enters the following
Amended Order which supersedes the earlier one.

Inasmuch as the

defendant dealer was dismissed from this cause by stipulation of

the parties, these rulings affect only plaintiffs and General
Motors Corporation.
It is hereby ORDERED:
1-

The jury verdict heretofore accepted is now rejected as

defective.
2.

Defendants' motion for directed verdict in their favor

and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action, is granted.
3.

Plaintiffs1 motion for new trial is denied.

DATED this _ 2 i T ^ y

of M a

¥ ' 1991-

06\HJC\0<+613.724\AMENDED. ORD
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LEEANN NAY, et al,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiffs,

:

CASE NO. C-88-6114

vs.

:

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
GMC TRUCK DIVISION
Defendants.

:

The Court having considered the Motion in Limine filed on
behalf

of

Memorandum

the

defendant,

General

Motors

Corporation,

in Support thereof, the Memorandum

the

in Opposition

thereto, all Affidavits filed herein relating to said Motions
and the total two volume depostion of Gerald Confer, and having
heard oral argument and now being fully advised in the premises
makes and enters this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The defendant's Motion is granted as to both the question
of the 1970, 1971, 1972 or 1973 vehicle year recall, and as to
the fact that since 1988 certain General Motors vehicles have
had a shield on the flexible coupling.
ruling

The basis for said

is inter alia, the Courts finding that the physical

location, and distance and spacing of the flexible coupling
from the frame rail or any other fixed object which could cause
a stone

NAY V. GENERAL MOTORS

PAGE TWO

interference

different

reason

is entirely

for the early

MINUTE ENTRY

and

1970's recall.

dissimilar
The Court

from the
is of the

further opinion that given the understanding of the public as
to the nature and mechanism of how recalls are instituted, a
jury could well believe that simply because the 1970 recall was
done, there was in fact a problem that necessitated a recall.
In actual

fact that recall was voluntarily done by General

Motors after only two claims of stone interference which may in
fact may not have occured.
subjected

to

the

The defendant herein should not be

prejudice

likely

to

be

attached

to

the

information regarding the 1973 recall simply because it was
being somewhat cautious in its approach to the alleged problem
when in fact the 1973 cars involved had an entirely different
location and spatial relationship between the flexible coupling
and

the

frame

rail

than

the

one

involved

in

this case.

Additionally the manner and method in which gravel or rocks
could be introduced into the flexible coupling area involve the
scooping of gravel by a frame cross-member. The vehicle in
question has no frame cross-member.

For these and for the other

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE THREE

NAY V. GENERAL MOTORS

reasons as set forth in the defendant's Memorandum, evidence of
such recall will not be introduceable at the time of trial•
As to the fact that some General Motors vehicles currently
carry a three hundred and sixty degree circular shield around
the flexible coupling, that likewise is not introduceable at
the time of trial.

It is clear that the reason that coupling

has that protective device is because since 1988 in certain of
the company's cars the steering gear box and flexible coupling
to it were relocated, and were the same design and type as used
in

the

automobiles.

As

they

carried

a

shield

in

the

automobiles the shield has simply been carried over into this
design, and would have no relevance or bearing upon whether or
not the vehicle in question should have had a shield.
prejudice

again

could

result

from

that

inference

In fact
being

improperly drawn by the jury, and that shouldn't be allowed
where the post-1988 location and shielding is not by reason of
an attempt to improve or change the situation existing in the
steering gear box and flexible coupling as it existed in the
vehicle involved in this case.
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H. JAMES CLEGG (A0681)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorney for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

LEEANN NAY, individually and
as personal representative for
MATTHEW AND MERISSA NAY, the
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and
as personal representatives for
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and JALYNN
NAY, the heirs of WAYNE NAY,

Appeal No. 910244

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
GMC TRUCK DIVISION AND RON
GREENE CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC,
INC.,
Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF EUGENE D. MARTENSON
STATE OF ALABAMA

)

COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

)

: SS.

Eugene D. Martenson being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.

I am a member in good standing of the Alabama Bar and

have personal knowledge of facts herein set forth.

2.

I was one of counsel for General Motors Corporation in

the trial, retrial and appeal of those consolidated matters
entitled Lowe v. General Motors Corporation and Fulford v.
General Motors Corporation and am fully familiar with the facts
and theories therein put forth.
3.

The vehicle involved in those cases was a 1971 Model

Chevrolet Impala which was subject to the General Motors
"B-Car" recall concerning possible stone interference between
flexible coupling and left frame member.
4.

That was the claim presented by plaintiffs' counsel and

experts.

The investigating officer and wrecker driver testi-

fied that they found a rock wedged and held fast in the
coupling.

The plaintiff experts opined that this rock rotated

with the coupling and caused stone interference with the frame
as described in the "B-Car" recall.
5.

It was plaintiffs1 theory that the rock precluded

proper rotation of the coupling and, hence, the steering
column, resulting in fatigue and eventual breakage of an
internal gear within the steering gear box.
6.

Thus, the claims in Fulford and Lowe involved substan-

tially the same accident scenario hazard as was addressed by
the recall.

One of the legal issues was whether the federal

recall statutes and regulations gave rise to a private cause of
action, not whether the recall was relevant.

2

7.

I have reviewed plainitffs1 brief on appeal in the case

of Nay v. General Motors, Appeal #910244, and understand plaintiffs allege a stone became lodged between the steering
coupling and the gear case.

This is not the same theory or

claim that was presented in the Alabama cases above described*
Those cases involved a claim of rock interference between
coupling and frame as described in the recall, not between
coupling and gear case.
8.

When the reported decision (624 F.2d 1373) refers to a

stone "inside the steering coupling" (p. 1376), it refers to a
stone allegedly trapped within the rotating steering coupling
with part of this stone allegedly protruding and contacting the
frame of the plaintiffs1 vehicle.
9.

The attached diagram shows, in ink, the position the

stone allegedly occupied in the Alabama cases.
Further affiant sayeth naught.

rgeine D. Martenspn
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5 ^
1991.

day of August,
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SKETCH N o , 3
Steering c o u p l i n g and frame on 1971 Chevrolet Impala.

